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Development of London 
 London is an ancient city whose history extends for nearly two thousand years.  
For much of that time, it has been a major player on the world stage and the driving force 
in English history.1  The city was founded by the Romans in the first century AD and was 
known then as Londinium.  Even in those days London was a prosperous trading 
community and an important administrative center, but the collapse of the Western 
Roman Empire in the fifth century greatly reduced the city’s wealth and population.2  
London was subsequently controlled by the migrating Anglo Saxons3 and then from 1066 
the Norman invaders ruled London.  Key aspects of London’s governing system of 
aldermen, sheriffs and a Lord Mayor were laid down by Norman London in the twelfth 
century and remain in place, albeit in a diminished form, into the modern day.  The 
mayor served a limited term and was elected from among the aldermen by the citizens of 
London, although often only the wealthy voters were allowed to attend.  The aldermen 
were elected for life by individuals from their ward, although the mayor and other 
aldermen could veto an election.  These aldermen wielded great powers over the 
Londoners in their wards and they protected their authority by restricting the involvement 
of ordinary citizens in civic activities.4 
                                                          
1 Walter Besant, The History of London. 2nd edition (London: Longmans, Green, and co., 1894), Chap 39. 
2 Stephen Inwood, A History of London. New York: Carroll & Graf Pub., 1998, 15-19, 33. 
3 Inwood. History of London. 35-36. 
4 Inwood. History of London. 59-67 
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From the early 1500’s until 1665, the population of London ballooned from a 
moderately sized city to the largest city in the Christian world at about five hundred 
thousand inhabitants.5  This growth was spurred mostly by migration from rural 
communities throughout England.  England itself had a negative natural growth, 
contributed mostly by the high mortalities in the overcrowded poor periphery of the city, 
while the wealthy city center could maintain a positive natural growth.6  This massive 
growth is a testament to the great economic power of London and its importance, but 
many of the migrants who came to London were desperately in search of food and work 
because the growing rural population was becoming a burden on England’s agricultural 
economy.  Many of these migrants were unsuccessful and became vagrants who were 
demonized by the public, considered a potential source of crime, abused, imprisoned by 
the authorities, and in many cases died of exposure and starvation.7 Even by comparison 
to other European and English cities, London was growing at a rapid pace8 despite the 
massive epidemics that could kill as much as one fifth of the city at a time. 
The Reformation in the mid sixteenth century brought about radical changes to 
London.  The dissolution of the monasteries transferred numerous burdens such as care 
for the poor, sick and orphans to the city authorities, who delegated these tasks primarily 
to the individual parishes. Their methods of poor and sick relief would persist through the 
Great Plague in 1665 and over time would be more formally crystallized as a function 
and power of the parish in a time when these functions were considered the role of 
                                                          
5 Inwood. History of London. 157. 
6 Neil Cummins, Morgan Kelly, and Cormac Ó Gráda, “Living standards and plague in London, 1560–1665.” 
Economic History Review 69, no. 1 (2016). 3. 
7 Inwood. History of London. 160-164. 
8 Cummins. “Living Standards.” 3. 
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charity not government programs.9 The dissolution of the monasteries, while occasionally 
harmful to the poor, was often personally beneficial to the King and the aristocrats who 
came into possession of such land.10   
 By 1665 London was the economic powerhouse of England and a major center of 
trade with its colonies, Northern Europe and more other distant regions such as the 
Levant.  This great economic growth brought wealth to the city and along with it, this 
growth brought merchants, laborers, and entertainers.  Not only were English merchants 
and laborers attracted to London but also large alien population, who set up their own 
communities and controlled a significant portion of trade through negotiating deals with 
and giving bribes to the King.11 A traveler to London would have seen many manners of 
things: people speaking a multitude of languages, bustling streets packed with shops and 
shoppers, and merchant ships unloading goods at docks on the Thames.  They would 
have seen a city of wide streets and large houses, whose residents could afford great 
luxuries and plenty of food.12  They would have also seen a city of narrow alleyways, 
cramped multifamily residences, and numerous vagrants.13  These two portraits of 
London reveal the consequences of London’s massive growth and economic importance, 
to which people of all backgrounds flocked to make a living.  London was a city in which 
                                                          
9 Richelle Munkhoff, “Poor women and parish public health in sixteenth-century London.” Renaissance 
Studies 28, no. 4 (2014): 579-596. 1-3. 
10 J. F. D. Shrewsbury, A History of Bubonic Plague in the British Isles (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1970), 152-154. 
11 Inwood. History of London. 100-107. 
12 Stephen Porter, Lord Have Mercy Upon Us: London’s Plague Years (Stroud, England: Tempus Publishing 
Limited, 2005), 197. 
13 Inwood. History of London. 167. 
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the rich and powerful controlled the administration and aggressively guarded their 
privileges.14    
 
History of Plague in the City  
 Plague has been endemic to the city of London since at least 1348, which began 
what modern writers would call the Black Death, although the Bacteriologist J.F.D. 
Shrewsbury considers the term unfit for historical literature and unfit as an 
epidemiological description seeing as bodies of plague victims turned purple not black.15  
Epidemics of plague struck England and especially London on regular intervals following 
1348.16  These plagues caused significant losses of life and wealth throughout England 
but the major trading cities such as London took the brunt of the destruction. The most 
significant of these early epidemics was the “Great Pestilence” from 1348 to 1349 which 
some claim destroyed half the population of England although Shrewsbury argues that 
the rural nature of England would have made the spread of plague difficult and notes no 
major economic or social changes as a result of the epidemic.  He places the total 
mortality at a not insignificant twenty percent.17  Plague may have been most feared, but 
London was also ravaged by numerous other epidemical diseases such as influenza, 
typhus, and smallpox.  In many cases, epidemics of plague during the Black Death were 
                                                          
14 Inwood. History of London. 67 
15 Shrewsbury. Bubonic Plague in the British Isles. 37. 
16 Stephen Porter, The Great Plague (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing Limited, 1999), 2. 
17 Shrewsbury. Bubonic Plague in the British Isles, 122-123. 
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likely supplemented by mortality from other epidemical diseases, especially in winter 
when infectious fleas hibernate.18   
 Medical science at this time was primitive by modern standards and physicians 
relied upon the methods used for other epidemic diseases.  Physicians by 1665 had 
accepted that many factors contributed to the spread of disease especially contact with an 
infected individual.  A lack of an understanding of the plague’s transmission from rat to 
man not only contributed to the failure to successfully combat the plague but also added 
to the disease’s fear and supernatural aura.19 Despite their inability to defend against the 
plague, physicians and medical science rather than spiritual assistance were the basis of 
the government’s response unlike in 1348. The English College of Physicians did not 
have full control over medicine in London during the epidemics.  They had rivals in the 
“chemical physicians,” who they claimed were frauds and indeed there were many in 
London who took advantage of people’s fears to sell home remedies and folklorish 
miracle cures.20 
The history of plague in London demonstrates the social stratification and 
increasing social stratification throughout London.  In 1563 the mortality rate was 
roughly equal across the city but by 1665 the mortality rate was much lower in the center 
of the city.  This drop in mortality rate corresponded with an increasing concentration of 
wealthy individuals in the city center.21  It also corresponded with the increasing use of 
bricks as house material among the wealthy as well as improved hygiene while also 
                                                          
18 Shrewsbury. Bubonic Plague in the British Isles. 127-128. 
19 Shrewsbury. Bubonic Plague in the British Isles. 124. 
20 Charles F. Mullett, The Bubonic Plague and England; an essay in the history of preventive medicine 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1956), 3. 
21 Cummins. “Living Standards.” 4, 9, 10. 
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corresponding with rapid urbanization of the ever more crowded parishes on the 
outskirts.22  The major plague epidemics in total though had a relatively constant 
mortality rate but the ever growing population of England ensured that epidemics would 
become deadlier overtime.23   
1665 would be the year of London’s deadliest outbreak of plague which would 
shortly thereafter be known as the Great Plague. The Great Plague has been a fairly well 
researched occurrence of plague in Europe.  In part because of the massive scope of 
destruction and its great impact on the quality of life for Londoners, the epidemic is 
useful for researching the response of the government to the plague.  The Great Plague in 
1665 produced considerably more literature than previous epidemics and allows one to 
understand the feelings of many literate Londoners towards the plague and the 
government’s response; from its medical or spiritual causes to the cruelty of the 
government’s public health policies.24  Even the Great Fire which occurred shortly after 
in 1666 failed to destroy most of the literature and public records.25 Unfortunately the 
primary literature is mostly from the more educated Londoners while most of the poor 
were illiterate. 
The Great Plague in London has also been analyzed and described by many 
modern writers, such as J. F. D. Shrewsbury’s A History of Bubonic Plague in the British 
Isles, Charles F. Mullett’s The Bubonic Plague and England, and Stephen Porter’s Lord 
Have Mercy Upon Us, which all dedicate a chapter to the 1665 epidemic.  Stephen 
                                                          
22 Cummins. “Living Standards.” 15. 
23 Cummins. “Living Standards.” 4 
24 Mullett. The bubonic Plague and England. 195 
25 Cummins. “Living Standards.” 4. 
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Porter’s The Great Plague, and Walter George Bell’s The Great Plague in London in 
1665 both are dedicated entirely to the Great Plague.  The Great Plague and plague in 
general is often fictionalized in movies and books.  One of the most fascinating being 
Defoe’s Journal of a Plague Year, which while fictional was written during a time when 
plague was still endemic to parts of Europe. 
 Records clearly indicate, and contemporary writers acknowledge that the poor 
were the primary victims of the plague.  There are many argued reasons such as poor 
living conditions, diet, and less access to proper hygiene, but this paper will focus 
specifically on the impact of government public health policies on the poor.  This paper 
will argue that the government’s health policies not only failed to help the sick but in fact 
harmed the poor while at the same time these policies did little harm to the wealthy and 
in some ways gave privileges to them.  Along with the official health policy, this paper 
will address inconsistencies in the application of public health policies and particularly 
the tool of quarantine. 
 Chapter one will discuss the response to the plague by all levels of governmental 
authority in London.  That would include the King, the English Privy Council, 
Parliament, the city administration, and most importantly the Parishes.  Their major 
contributions and responsibilities will be outlined and a detailed description of the 
intended implementation of quarantine will be given. 
 Chapter two discusses the negative impact of quarantine on the individual and 
argues both that the public health policies were written in a manner that was more 
palatable to those with wealth and the quarantine was inconsistently applied to the 
wealthy.  In addition, it will focus on the public health workers who were predominantly 
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poor and often coerced into accepting dangerous, undesirable, and poorly paid jobs.  This 
chapter will also describe the difficulties imposed upon middle class individuals who fled 
London but struggled to find residence outside of London due to restrictions placed upon 
the movement of people during Plague times. 
 Chapter three focuses on the economic impact of the plague and especially the 
government’s response.  To do this it will focus on the restrictions to trade, the costs on 
the individual in quarantine, and the costs to the parishes.  It will also explain the 
inequalities in funding and the needs of the various parishes and how one’s geographical 










Chapter 1: The Response 
The year 1665 was a tumultuous time for the City of London and Great Britain as 
a whole.  Only five years after the restoration of the Monarchy under Charles II and 
England was once again struck by disaster.  The period of 1665-66 would witness both 
the Great Plague of London as well as the Great Fire; both of which devastated the city.  
The Great Plague was both London’s deadliest plague epidemic but also its final major 
outbreak, and in total, London’s Bills of Mortality recorded 70,5941 dead of plague 
although it is estimated to have been as much as 100,000.2    
The 1665 plague epidemic, which would become known as the Great Plague, was 
a great calamity for the city of London and its people.  Besides the tremendous loss of 
life, it also created economic and social hardships for London’s inhabitants.  Despite, and 
perhaps as a result of the government’s efforts, the plague was never brought under 
control, and while all of London suffered it was the poor who suffered far more than the 
well off.  They owed their suffering in part to the terrible living conditions of the 
impoverished sections of London, but they also owed their suffering to the government 
policies, which provided little assistance to the poor and in many instances had a 
disparately negative impact on the poor.  Thus, this study will focus its attention on the 
socio-economic conditions of London and take into account the actions or inactions of 
                                                          
1 By the Company of Parish-Clerks of London, London’s dreadful visitation: or, a collection of all the Bills of 
Mortality for this present year: beginning the 27th of December 1664 and ending the 19th of December 
following: as also the general or whole years bill.  According to the report made to the King’s most 
excellent Majesty (London: E. Cotes, 1665), 109, 112. 
2 Shrewsbury. Bubonic Plague in the British Isles. 446 
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the government; particularly the impact of orders and recommendations made by the 
authorities in London.   
The preface to the first edition of The Great Plague in London in 1665 by the 
historian Walter George Bell begins: “This book tells a tragedy of the poor.  A few 
men—very few—of birth, position, and wealth stayed in London, sharing the suffering 
which was the lot of all, and there are names that gained added lustre in that year of 
calamity; but in its immensity and in overwhelming proportion it was “the poore’s 
Plague.”3 Bell laces his analysis of the Great Plague with harsh criticism of the 
government’s ineffective response, yet despite the promising first paragraph of his 
preface, he does not put any particular focus on the impact of the government’s policies 
on the poor, although he does acknowledge that the authorities’ failures came at the 
expense of Londoners.   
In seventeenth century England, plague epidemics were not a common 
occurrence, but plague was endemic to the region which recorded several plague deaths 
annually.4  Plague had existed in England at least since the beginning of the Black Death 
in 1347,5 and had been responsible for a significant loss of life, yet London was 
frequently the victim of other epidemic diseases such as small pox and spotted fever 
which also devastated the populace.6  For the people of 1665 London, disease was an 
everyday threat.    
                                                          
3 Walter George Bell, The Great Plague in London in 1665 (London: Bodley Head, 1951), ix. 
4 Bills of Mortality. 5. 
5 Shrewsbury. Bubonic Plague in the British Isles. 37. 
6 William Boghurst, Loimographia: An Account of the Great Plague of London in the year 1665. Edited by 
Joseph Frank Payne (London: Shaw and Sons, 1894), 20. 
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Biology of Plague 
The 1665 epidemic is believed to have been caused by the bacteria Yersinia 
pestis,7 and the infection manifested itself mostly in the form of Bubonic Plague, 
although Pneumonic was likely present to some degree.8  Descriptions from 1665 of the 
disease’s signs and symptoms as well as more recent DNA analysis of mass graves dating 
to 1665 has leant evidence to the theory that Yersinia pestis was responsible for the 1665 
epidemic.  In addition to 1665, Yersinia pestis is believed to have been the cause of the 
Black Death as well as the earlier Justinian plague of the sixth century and perhaps even 
the Plague in Athens described by Thucydides.  Bubonic Plague, often shortened to 
plague or referred to as the pest or pestilence, is characterized by fever, headache, chills, 
and most characteristically by swollen lymph nodes called buboes.9  The English 
physician Nathanial Hodges observed, “The signs more peculiar to a Pestilence, are those 
Pustules which the common people call Blains, Buboes, Carbuncles, Spots, and those 
marks called Tokens.”10  The combination of: symptoms, high lethality, and uncontrolled 
infectivity made plague the most feared disease in London.11 
Understanding the biology of plague is essential to understanding the factors that 
influenced the spread of the disease and contributed to its high infectivity.  Humans are 
not the natural hosts of the plague bacterium; rather rodents such as the Black Rat are the 
                                                          
7 MOLA team. 2016. “1665 Great Plague bacterium DNA identified for the first time.” Museum of London 
Archeology. 
8 Shrewsbury. Bubonic Plague in the British Isles. 
9 CDC.gov. 2015. “Plague: Symptoms.” 
10 Nathaniel Hodges, Loimologia or An Historical account of the plague in London in 1665: with 
precautionary directions against the plague. Translated by John Quincy (London: E. Bell, 1720), Early 
English Books Online, 87. 
11 Boghurst. Loimographia. 5, 15. 
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bacteria’s natural host.  A human body generally becomes infected when a rat flea 
abandons a recently dead rat and searches for the nearest living thing on which it can 
sustain itself,12 and in the crowded residences of the poor in London, humans fell easy 
prey to fleas carrying the deadly plague.  The building materials used in the houses of the 
poor were perfect living environments for rats thus the poor came in much closer contacts 
with the rats who carried the disease, while the rich would have had less contact.  Only 
the rarer pneumonic plague can spread from person to person.13   
 
Government Authorities in London 
London of 1665 was overseen by several levels of authority.  The uppermost level 
of government in England would have been the English King, who in 1665 was Charles 
II and whose crown had just been restored14 five years earlier following the death of 
Oliver Cromwell and the end of the English republic.  The Sovereign’s main means of 
action came through the English Privy Council which acted as both an advisor to the 
King and virtually as its own executive branch. The English Parliament consisted of the 
House of Lords and the House of Commons.  As a legislative body it was especially 
important in regulating finances and the taxation necessary to undertake a massive public 
health response.15 The next level of authority in London would have been the Lord 
Mayor and the Council of Aldermen who were the main administrative authority in the 
                                                          
12 CDC.gov. “Plague: ecology and transmission.” Last modified September 14, 2015.  
13 CDC.gov. “Plague: Symptoms.” Last Modified September 14, 2015.  
14 Richard Lord Braybrooke. Ed. The Diary of Samuel Pepys, ESQ., F.R.S. from 1659 to 1669 with memoir. 
(London: Frederick Warne and Co., 1887); Harvard University – Collection Development Department, 
Widener Library. April 23rd 1661. 
15 Braybrooke, The Diary of Samuel Pepys, November 25th. 
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City.  Their actions during the 1665 epidemic were mainly to enforce the orders set down 
from the Privy Council as well as their own orders.  Both the Privy Council and the city 
administration set down orders specific to the plague in London, but the Privy Council 
also contributed to Kingdom wide regulations. 16 These layers of authority were run by 
the wealthy and powerful from within London and throughout England.  They were made 
up of the rich merchants, landed elites, and in general the groups of people who would 
flee London at the outbreak of plague, yet they were responsible for ensuring the 
wellbeing of the poor as well.     
At the bottom most level of London’s government were the parishes which served 
both a religious and secular role.  London and its suburbs were divided into sections with 
each based around a parish.  The Parishes in London can be roughly categorized as those 
within the Walls of London, those outside of the Walls, and those belonging to the 
“outparishes” of Middlesex and Surrey.17  These categorizes make an important 
distinction between parishes because those within the walls tended to be wealthier than 
those outside the walls.18  The Parish was the main body responsible for community 
issues such as public health and caring for the poor.  It was made responsible for carrying 
out many of the public health orders created by the City government and Privy Council 
and thus was of paramount importance during the plague of 1665 as well as earlier 17th 
century plagues. 19 
 
                                                          
16 Mullett. The Bubonic plague and England. 200. 
17 Bills of Mortality. 5. 
18 Cummins. “Living Standards.” 4, 9, 10. 
19 Munkhoff. “Poor Women and Public Health.” 580. 
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Bills of Mortality 
As the protectors of England and interested in ensuring economic and social 
stability, the government took an active role at all levels in managing the epidemic and 
coping with the consequences.  A large and evolving aspect of the government’s response 
to the plague was the Bills of Mortality.  By 1665 the Bills of Mortality were published 
documents that listed several demographic details: the number of people who were buried 
in each parish, both total buried and those buried due to dying of the plague, as well as 
the total number of burials within the city of London and its suburbs.20 The Bills of 
mortality were first developed in the year 1518, and were at first simpler documents that 
only recorded plague deaths and were only published during large epidemics of plague.  
Later they would become more detailed and would be published more regularly 
especially in the period before the 1665 epidemic.21  
The Bills of Mortality informed the government as well as ordinary citizens on 
the status of an epidemic and which places of London suffered the highest mortality.  
Ideally this could have helped the government direct a response if an outbreak of plague 
was appearing and could give warning to the inhabitants of London so they could prepare 
by stocking up on supplies and medicine, be more cautious to avoid others, and to even 
flee the city if they wished.   
Many individuals both contemporaries, and modern historians have criticized the 
Bills of Mortality for its inaccuracies.  A major problem revolved around the recording 
                                                          
20 Bills of Mortality. 5. 
21 Inwood. History of London.   
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not of deaths but rather of burials.22  Thus only those buried by the parish were included 
in the Bills of Mortality while non-conformists such as Anabaptists and Puritans were not 
included as they performed their own burials.  In addition, the high death rate among the 
poor and homeless at the peak of the epidemic would have made it difficult to accurately 
record all burials and causes of death. The famous diarist Samuel Pepys, a member of the 
naval administration and future MP, noted on August 31st that: “In the city died this week 
7496, and of them 6102 of the plague. But it is feared that the true number of the dead 
this week is near 10,000; partly from the poor that cannot be taken notice of, through the 
greatness of the number, and partly from the Quakers and others that will not have any 
bell ring for them.” 23 Another criticism revolves around determining whether an 
individual died of plague or another disease.  The large influx of dead, the often low 
training of those who determined cause of death, and the similarities between the 
symptoms of common endemic and epidemic diseases could make the number of burials 
due to plague more inaccurate.  Therefore determining deaths in the city and especially 
determining deaths in certain segments of the city such as the poorer parishes outside of 
the wall could be inaccurate if based solely on the Bills of Mortality. 
The historian Walter Bell argues that the most significant factor in the 
inaccuracies of the Bills were the failure of searchers and clerks to document all of the 
deaths in a time when there were so many and to accurately identify plague as cause of 
death.  He insists that the omission of the non-conformists from the Bills would not 
produce significant inaccuracies because of their relatively small populations,24 although 
                                                          
22 Bills of Mortality. 5. 
23 Braybrooke, The Diary of Samuel Pepys, August 31st. 
24 Bell. The Great Plague. 180-181. 
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J. F. D. Shrewsbury disagrees with that assessment and instead argues that exclusion of 
non-conformists was a significant flaw in the Bills and greatly contributed to their 
unreliability.  Shrewsbury does agree with Bell about the trouble with recording and 
identifying causes of death in such a great mortality and with so few laborers for the task.  
Though Shrewsbury also considers wide spread falsification to have been significant and 
observes that the non-plague causes of death greatly increased over their normal averages 
during the epidemic, although honest misidentification of the cause of death was likely a 
significant factor also.25 
 
Government Response to the Plague 
The rulers of London and of England responded to the plague at multiple levels.  
Throughout 1665 King Charles actively responded to the epidemic by directing the 
government’s focus on the plague and also directly through proclamations.  One such 
proclamation issued during the 1665 epidemic prohibited Barnwell Fair from remaining 
near Cambridge “that no good means may be neglected to stay the further spreading of 
the present infection and contagion, doth find it convenient to prevent all occasions of 
publick concourse.”26 The English Privy Council was, in 1665, active in crafting and 
issuing orders for preventing the spread of the infection, in contrast to the Parliament 
which was less active.  This was in part because the Parliament avoided meeting during 
                                                          
25 Shrewsbury. Bubonic Plague in the British Isles. 445. 
26 By the King. A Proclamation Prohibiting the keeping of Barnwell-Fair near Cambridge (London: John Bill 
and Christopher Barker, June 14, 1665), Early English Books online, 1. 
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the epidemic in order to avoid spreading the infection amongst its members.27  Even after 
the end of the 1665 epidemic, the Parliament was unable to reach an agreement on 
modifying the plague orders to be more effective.28  Yet the Privy Council’s major 
actions in crafting orders occurred before and after the outbreak of plague in 1665 and 
they only met three times over the course of the epidemic.29  The Lord Mayor and 
aldermen acted in a similar manner to the Privy Council.  They published orders for 
preventing the spread of the plague and directly tried to ensure they were implemented by 
the parishes.  The city government tried many things to prevent the spread of the plague, 
including the lighting of bonfires, two to each parish.30 Pepys writes in his diary on 
September 6th, observing the Lord Mayor’s order: “To London, to pack up more things; 
and there I saw fires burning in the street as it is through the whole city, by the Lord 
Mayor’s order.”31  
The authorities were well aware, before the epidemic broke out, that plague was 
ravaging continental Europe and the Dutch in particular, whose large merchant fleet 
could inadvertently carry plague to England.  For this reason, quarantines were placed on 
ships entering London that were suspected of departing from an infected harbor.32  This 
harmed the Dutch especially and did not help negotiations attempting to avoid war 
between England and Holland.  Thus, while England was preparing for and responding to 
                                                          
27 By the King. A Proclamation concerning the prorogation of the parliament (London: John Bill and 
Christopher Barker, August 30, 1665), Early English Books online, 1. 
28 Mullett. Bubonic Plague in England. 209 
29 Shrewsbury. Bubonic Plague in the British Isles. 448. 
30 Cautionary Rules for preventing The Sickness; Published by Order of the Lord Mayor (London: James 
flesher, 1665), Early English Books Online, 1. 
31 Braybrooke, The Diary of Samuel Pepys, September 6th. 
32 Porter, Lord Have Mercy, 190-193. 
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the plague it was also preparing for war.  The protection of sailors and other institutions 
necessary for war from the plague became a priority for the government.33   
One of the best sources of written evidence attesting to the government’s attempts 
at a plague response were published directions and orders directed to the parish 
authorities.  The public health orders issued in 1665 were simply the same public health 
orders used in past plague epidemics, although they tended to be more detailed.34 These 
were the same plague orders that had proven unable to halt those past epidemics and 
faced with another epidemic in 1665 the order’s writers avoided innovation.35 As the poor 
suffer most in an epidemic of plague, the failure of the government to even attempt to 
change their policies, and the consistent failure to correctly apply their policies shows a 
lack of serious care for the victims of a plague epidemic.  
Bell argues that the nature of English and particularly London government 
administration made the implementation of a public health response difficult.  The city 
delegated responsibility into over a hundred parishes each with autonomy in directing the 
response and the land was divided unequally among the parishes.  Bell argues that the 
largest parishes, which existed outside the walls and were very poor, had the most costs 
and the least ability to administer yet they were expected to carry out the public health 
orders to safeguard the entire city against plague.36 
In addition to government institutions, the English medical establishment took a 
key role in combating the plague epidemic.  The English College of Physicians was 
                                                          
33 Mullet. The Bubonic Plague and England. 200-201. 
34 Mullett. Bubonic Plague in England. 198. 
35 Boghurst. Loimographia. 57. 
36 Bell. The Great Plague, 77. 
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founded in 1518 and since then had acted as the chief advisor on matters of personal and 
public health.37  During the epidemic of 1665 as well as past epidemics, the College of 
Physicians worked as advisors to the local and regional authorities and was expected to 
provide medical assistance to those infected with plague as well as routine care.  As 
authorities on disease and medicine, the College was tasked with drawing up 
recommendations for means to combat the disease.38  In addition members routinely 
published advice for personal protection such as proper diet, fuming with brimstone, 
taking preventative medicines, &c.39  At the personal level, physicians also met with 
patients to check on the state of the infection, to prescribe particular medicines, and 
occasionally, albeit rarely, to perform operations such as bloodletting.40  It is from these 
personal visits as well as autopsies that the large bulk of early modern medical literature 
was written.41   
The founding of the College of Physicians in 1518 was a step towards improving 
public health in England.  Following the Dissolution of the Monasteries in the 1536,42 the 
government was required to ensure that the medical services provided by the church were 
continued through secular hospitals.  So by 1665 the response to disease epidemics was 
firmly in the hands of the government and College of Physicians.  Hygiene in London, 
especially in the poorer communities, had started to become an area of interest to public 
health experts.  This focus is understandable considering the believed causes of disease in 
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1600’s England.  Physicians believed that a multitude of factors contributed to initial 
infection and subsequent spreading.  Some examples are bad air, rotting food, dense 
populations, and sewage accumulation.43  Yet despite this interest in hygiene, London 
was a very unsanitary city and a perfect breeding ground for rats.44   
The dissolution of the monasteries and the end of Catholic Church control not 
only impacted the public health in England but also harmed the relief of the poor who 
relied on the Church.  In discussing the great plague it is important to also discuss poor 
relief in London because public health and poor relief were closely intertwined.  It was 
among the poor that the plague took the greatest toll45 and it was among the poor that the 
parishes found most of their plague workers.  Especially those on poor relief who 
frequently would perform menial services at the request of the parish.46  In this sense 
giving those on poor relief the jobs necessary to enact a plague response was simply an 
extension of the normal employment the parish gave to the poor. 
A target demographic of the anti-plague orders were the poor communities.  Their 
reasoning is described in Cautionary Rules for preventing the Sickness, which stated, 
“care of the poor will much conduce to the preventing their being sick… and 
consequently give check to the growth of the plague, which both began and is continued 
almost altogether amongst the poor.”47  This instance of official orders, demonstrates the 
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governments recognition of the poor both as disproportionate victims but also as an 
important demographic in the government’s response to the plague. 
 
Quarantine 
The high mortality rate and difficulty curing the plague led the College of 
Physicians to direct their efforts towards prevention rather than cure.  They published 
many suggestions for personal as well as public protection.  Among other things they 
advocated: the taking of preventative medicines, burning or carrying smelling objects 
such as tobacco, and airing a potentially diseased room in order to reduce its infectivity.48  
Yet the policy which received the greatest attention as well as criticism, both from other 
physicians and the public, was the policy of quarantining infected individuals, often 
referred to as “Shutting up.”  
The policy of shutting up was effectively quarantine but often included not just 
the infected individual but also everyone else who resided with them, which in the poor 
communities could be several families.49  Quarantine was mostly applied to the poor and 
thus any suffering derived from this policy, which had been around since at least the 
times of King Henry VIII, fell on them.50  In addition to quarantining people in their own 
residences, pesthouses were built prior to the outbreak for the infected to be taken and 
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cared for, but often the infected individual’s residence would be quarantined even if he 
were removed to the pesthouse, but at least to the crafters of the orders this was a more 
humane approach than locking sick and healthy together.  A lack of pesthouses meant 
that this tactic was not used often,51 and regardless of whether or not the sick were 
removed the pesthouses, those healthy individuals still suffered the drop-in quality of life 
inflicted upon those in quarantine.   
The orders and directions set down by the Lord Mayor or the Privy Council 
provide a detailed manual for implementing quarantine.  The orders were not limited to 
the quarantine but the bulk of the orders were dedicated to it.  The almost singular 
purpose of the public health orders to direct the implementation of quarantine reflects 
both the complexity of organizing a mass quarantine effort and the importance placed by 
the government on the practice of quarantine, and like with most other public health 
policies within London and its suburbs, the parish was made responsible for carrying out 
the orders.  The parish was responsible for hiring or procuring examiners, watchmen, 
searchers, nurses, physicians, buriers and chirurgions (an older word for Surgeon but less 
prestigious than a physician).52  
The examiners would be responsible for ensuring that anti-plague orders were 
followed, including ensuring that infected individuals were quarantined and their 
residence shut up along with any other inhabitants.53  Examiners would search out 
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infected individuals and were to be informed if someone had died of the plague.54  
Individuals were also required to inform an examiner within two hours if they or any 
individual in their residence had become infected.55  After a house was shut up and its 
residents no longer allowed to leave, the examiner was also responsible for ensuring that 
the quarantined individuals received proper care in the form of medical treatments and 
supplies necessary to survive such as food.56  In addition to these two tasks, the examiner 
would also assign two watchmen, one during the day and one at night, to stand guard at a 
shut up building or buildings to prevent people or goods from entering or leaving.  A red 
wooden cross would also be added to the door of the infected house, which read “Lord 
have Mercy on us.”57  Records show that people were indeed prosecuted for violating a 
number of these regulations such as people entering or leaving quarantined property and 
removing goods from infected houses.58 
Searchers were hired to investigate houses in order to determine if any individuals 
were infected or had died and searchers were to be assisted by chirurgions in identifying 
the disease since searchers had little to no medical training.59  The orders determined that 
chirurgions were to be paid twelve-pence per body searched.  This payment would come 
from the individual searched or form the parish if the individual had no means of 
paying.60 Searchers as well as chirurgions were considered necessary in tracking the 
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spread of the plague so the infected areas would know the level of infection and respond 
adequately.  
“For better assistance of the searchers, for as much as there hath been 
heretofore great abuse in misreporting the disease, to the further 
spreading of infection: It is therefore ordered that there be chosen and 
appointed able and discreet Chirugions… in every of their mimits to 
joyn with the searchers for the view of the body, to the end there may 
be a true report made of the disease”61 
Searchers, like many other plague workers, were hired from among the poorer sort in the 
parishes of London and were often individuals on parish poor relief.62 
To care for the sick, the City and parishes hired nurses and requisitioned 
physicians from the College of Medicine.  In total, four physicians were assigned to care 
for the infected within London and over the course of the epidemic several other 
physicians offered their services, although the wealthier residents had their own personal 
physicians.63 Dr. Edward Austry and Dr. Nicolas Davis were two such physicians that 
offered their service. 
“four were enough to take charge and care upon them, the infection 
not then so generally dispersed, as since it hath been; of which four 
afterwards two only (possibly more forward than the rest to undertake so 
great a burden) whether to ease the common purse of that charge, which 
was incident to that service, or upon other reasons, have been judged 
sufficient to undergo said service, and take care of all infected persons in 
and about the city, and are imployed accordingly… And that the said two 
Physitians appointed by the late Establishment cannot possibly attend the 
deplorable vast Number of Persons laboring under so sad a Distemper… 
we are, and shall be, according to His Majesties Command, and the duty 
incumbent upon us, ready and willing to attend the Service, to visit, and 
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according to our several Abilities, with all possible diligence, to take care 
of all Persons in and about this City…” 64  
Physicians during the epidemic generally diagnosed cases of plague and judged the odds 
of survival.  Afterwards they might perform medical procedures such as bloodletting or 
most commonly forced sweating,65 and advising the patient in the use of certain 
medicines and means of air purification.  Most of the medical care was provided by 
nurses which ranged from complete strangers to family members of the infected.  They 
generally had no medical training beyond common knowledge66 and primarily served to 
comfort the sick. It is apparent from the literature of the times that Nurses were looked on 
in the best cases as strangers and in the worst cases as ugly, dirty, hags who would rather 
kill and steal from their patients than care for them.67 The few wealthy individuals who 
suffered under quarantine had the capacity to receive better care from their personal 
physicians and servants rather than poor strangers who, although they fear the plague, act 
as nurses out of necessity and would otherwise starve. 
To ensure that that those who were trapped in quarantine received the essential for 
their survival such as food, water and medicine; the parishes were responsible for 
acquiring and dispersing these essential goods to those in quarantine.68  The payment for 
these essential goods came, in the case of the poor, from the parish but others had to pay 
the parish in part or in whole for their own care.  If an individual was expected to pay for 
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their own care but lacked enough money, then either some of their property was seized or 
they were forced to take out a loan.69 It had also been suggested that offering to care for 
those in quarantine would make the infected more likely to inform the parish and less 
likely to conceal their illness.70 
If the worst occurred and an individual died, which was very common during the 
outbreak, then they would need to be buried.  Burials were, at first, restricted to night 
(After sunset and before sunrise) but as the death toll increased the burials occurred in 
daylight hours.71 The rise in deaths also forced grave diggers to create mass graves in 
which bodies were crammed together and may have been buried as shallow as one meter 
which was not nearly as deep as the law required.72 One disturbing incident recounted by 
Samuel Pepys in his diary describes the disparity in the treatment of the dead based upon 
wealth.  
July 18th: “…I was much troubled this day to hear at Westminster how the 
officers do bury the dead in the open Tuttle-field, pretending want of room 
elsewhere; whereas the new chappell church-yard was walled in at the 
publick charge in the last plague-time, merely for want of room and now 
none, but such as are able to pay dear for it, can be buried there.”73 
 Accompanying the burials were the sounds of a bell tolling, which reminded the living to 
be careful so they may avoid dying of the plague also.74 A policy that was both disliked 
and often ignored, forbid people from accompanying the body during its transport and 
holding a funeral.75 Samuel Pepys commented on this practice: “…consider the madness 
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of the people of the town, who will (because they are forbid) come in crowds along with 
the dead corpses to see them buried.”76 This was a measure of public health to keep 
people from gathering, especially in a cemetery which was believed to be more infectious 
because of the fumes rising from the dead.  
The implementation of quarantine as well as other orders and recommendations 
presented by government authorities and the College of Physicians were not as 
effectively implemented in practice as they were imagined on paper.  The quarantine 
failed at many levels: people hid their infection to avoid being shut up,77 others managed 
to escape quarantine,78 and in total there was a lack of resources to ensure that quarantine 
could be applied and sustained for such a large infected population. The former Puritan 
minister Thomas Vincent described the fate of quarantine in London: “Now shutting up 
of visited houses (there being so many) is at an end, and most of the well are mingled 
among the sick which otherwise would have got not help.”79 By the epidemic’s peak, the 
system of quarantine had essentially broken down.  Samuel Pepys remarks in his diary on 
September 14th, “And Lord!  To see how I did endeavor all I could to talk with as few as 
I could, there being now no observation of shutting up of houses infected, that to be sure 
we do converse and meet with people that have the plague upon them.”80  
Bell levels particularly harsh criticism against the quarantine even though he 
states that an effective quarantine could have been effective at preventing the high 
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mortality.  Talking of quarantine he says: “the evil policy had long precedent behind it, 
and had, unfortunately, the approval of the college of physicians.  As a body, the 
magistrates were insistent, and the support of the Privy Council in this disastrous measure 
never wavered; none in authority ever questioned the necessity of sealing all houses 
wherein infection lodged.”81 This sentiment was shared by other modern writers on the 
Great Plague such as Stephen Porter and Shrewsbury. 
 
Flight from London  
A response to the epidemic that provoked anger and controversy was the practice 
of fleeing London.82  This was accepted by physicians as the best way of avoiding 
epidemical diseases.83 Fleeing was an expensive endeavor so that of those who fled were 
primarily the wealthy and some of the middle class.84  And for those who managed to 
flee, they could not guarantee their funds would hold out85 nor could they guarantee they 
would be allowed entrance into another town.  Many towns at this point required 
certificates of health from individuals seeking entry86 and the guards were especially 
suspicious of individuals from London.  Samuel Pepys remarked that he had trouble 
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entering the town of Greenwich since he had recently been in London, yet as an 
important individual his name was enough to grant him entrance.87  
A Problem for the people who remained in London and especially a problem for 
the organization of a government response, was the flight of individuals from within the 
government88 as well as physicians.89 The reasons for fleeing likely varied for different 
physicians, but for many their wealthy clients had already fled London and it is no doubt 
that some may have fled simply to avoid the plague.90  Either way, it harmed the public 
health response, likely by harming the population’s opinion of it, despite the 
ineffectiveness of seventeenth century medicine.  The flight of government officials 
likely also harmed the organization of a public health response since desertion was 
widespread.91  Samuel Pepys, himself a member of the naval administration, who 
remained in London, remarks on June 30th, “To white hall, to the duke of Albemarle, who 
I find at secretary bennet’s, there being now no other great statesman, I think, but my lord 
Chancellor, in towne.”92 
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Chapter 2: Quarantine 
From the published writings of the period, it is apparent that opposition to the 
practice of quarantine, or “shutting up,” was nearly universal outside of the government 
and the College of Physicians.  Opposition came from people of different backgrounds, 
from priests to even physicians, and they had multiple and varied reasons for opposition.  
This chapter will demonstrate that quarantine was considered cruel, considered medically 
unsound, and not consistently implemented against the rich and powerful.  In addition I 
will demonstrate that the poor were coerced into taking the dangerous and low paying 
jobs necessary to carry out the public health response.  Lastly I will compare the impact 
of government policies on those middle class individuals and wealthy individuals who 
attempted to flee London. 
 
Criticisms of Quarantine: 
The most common complaint against the practice of quarantine was based upon 
the perception of the quarantine as inhumane and especially unchristian.  Among 
religious writers, comparisons of the Christian Londoner’s response to the plague and the 
Islamic response to the plague generally painted the “heathen” Muslims in a more 
positive light than their Christian counterparts. Nathanial Hodge described the quarantine 
as “that practice so abhorrent to Religion and Humanity, even in the Opinion of a 
Mahometan, of shutting up the sick and well together.”1 Another writer commented: “To 
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visit, relieve and exhilarate any whom god hath wounded with his pestilential arrow, is 
the part of a truly religious Samaritan; as to flie from him, or keep aloof, when he many 
preserve or do him some good, is onely proper to some distrustful wicked priests, levites, 
and galenists.  The mahumetans may justly reprove and shame us Christians.”2 Religion 
in general, although not so great as in the plagues of the Middle Ages, played an 
important role in the perception of writers and others towards the plague even if it played 
less of an official role.  Talking of the early Christians, one anonymous writer in 1665 
said, “then they did not excommunicate whole families when it pleased God to visit 
them; no, then the elders of the church carefully attended them, prayed with them, and the 
effectual fervent prayer of those righteous men availed much.”3  The religious complaints 
often went hand in hand with other moral complaint accusing the quarantine of being 
cruel.  One writer who went by J. V., vividly described the cruelty of quarantine: 
“Not a friend to come neigh them in their many, many heart and house 
cares and complexities.  They are compelled, though well, to lie by, to 
watch upon the death-bed of their dear relation, to see the corpse dragged 
away before their eyes.  Affrighted children stand howling by their side.  
Thus they are fitted by fainting affliction to receive the impressions of a 
thousand fearful thoughts, in that long night they have to reckon with 
before release, as the family, so dismally exposed, sink one after another 
in the den of this dismal likeness of hell, contrived by the advice of the 
English college of doctors.”4 
The city’s attempt to safeguard the health of the rest of the city was considered too cruel, 
especially the notion that the healthy would be subjected to confinement.  The prospects 
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of confinement for at least forty days remains frightening even today, despite the greater 
understanding of the efficacy of quarantine. 
Hand-in-hand with the moral/religious complaint against the quarantine, but likely 
more tangible, was an argument that quarantine would be economically harmful.  Trade 
within the city diminished, and at the epidemic’s peak it was virtually non-existent, 
because of growing poverty; less working merchants, laborers, and artisans; and 
restrictions on trade.  Dr. George Thomas, a chemical physician at odds with the 
physicians of the College of Physicians gave his harsh condemnation of the quarantine: 
“might be more conducible to the body politick and natural, if this rigid 
course of enclosing the infected to strickly within so narrow a compass 
were mitigated: for hereby intercourse of trading might be kept alive, and 
so miserable poverty prevented, which hath always an equipage and train 
of sad calamities and plagues attending upon it… certainly none but such 
an heathen as galen would have given his disciples such impious and 
uncharitable advice, as to leave poor distressed wretches to a lord have 
mercy upon them…”5  
The financial health of the “body politick” is certainly important to the English 
administration especially in a time of war.  Samuel Pepys provided his perspective during 
the epidemic of the cost of the war:   
“All our fear is that the Dutch should be got in before them; which would 
be a very great sorrow to the publick… A great deal of money being spent, 
and the kingdom not in a condition to spare, nor a parliament without 
much difficulty to meet to give more.”6   
The economics of quarantine would play a major role in both the downfall of quarantine 
in 1665 and the impact on the poor, for whom the quarantine represented a devastating 
loss of income. 
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A last major complaint against the quarantine stated that the quarantine not only 
failed to stop the spread of the plague but in addition increased both the spread of the 
plague and its mortality.  Quarantine was greatly feared by Londoners and many tried to 
avoid quarantine by hiding their illness, secretly removing dead from their buildings, 
bribing public health workers, etc.  An anonymous writer in a printed pamphlet in 
London, in his cry for the ending of the cruel quarantine, describes the reaction of those 
about the be shut up: 
“We are acted by a principle of self preservation, as well as you, and 
therefore as soon as we find ourselves or any member of our families 
infected, so dreadful it is to us to be shut up from all comfort and society, 
from free and wholesome air, from the care of the physician, and the 
divine, from the oversight of friends and relations, and sometimes even 
from the very necessities, and conveniences of nature, that we run as far in 
city and country as our feet can carry us…scattering the infection along 
the streets as we go, and shifting it from lodging to lodging with ourselves, 
till as last we drop in some ally, field, or neighbour village, calling the 
people round-about by the suddenness of our fall to stand awhile 
astonished at our deaths,”7 
The notion that individuals would try to avoid the dreaded quarantine appears 
valid and is supported by accounts of individuals avoiding quarantine in one 
manner or another and both Bell, Stephen Porter, and Shrewsbury acknowledge 
that avoiding quarantine was widespread, whether by flight or by bribery or some 
other means. 
Besides arguing that quarantine spreads the plague, critics also believed that 
quarantine increased the mortality rate.  Among other things, contemporary writers 
argued that the bad air trapped in the quarantined building and even fear caused by 
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quarantine worked to kill more people. Four astrologers strayed from their discussion of 
astrology to criticize quarantine: “But that the shutting up of people in a time of 
sickness…is certainly a great cause of the increase of the Contagion… the greater their 
fear is, the sooner do they meet the ill they dread.  And we in this age, shut up not only 
the unclean but the sound and sick together.”8 “This shutting up would breed a plague if 
there were none: infection may have killed its thousands, but shutting up hath killed its 
ten thousands.”9 This notion of the quarantine breeding plague was argued even by 
physicians in the city but the practice continued regardless.10  
 
Inconsistent use of Quarantine: 
The suffering caused by the quarantine was inconsistent and varied over time, 
location, and random fortune.  Being locked in quarantine was bad enough but not 
everyone received the same treatment in quarantine.  The parish was expected to provide 
medical care and essential supplies so that those locked in quarantine would maintain at 
least a minimal quality of life, yet the unequal ability of different parishes to provide care 
as well as the varied dispositions of watchmen and other public health officials in a given 
area ensured that not everyone in quarantine received the same level of care, and it was 
among the poor that the level of care was lowest.  
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Watchmen, essentially guards and caretakers, were responsible not only for 
ensuring that no one entered or left and infected building or buildings but also brought 
supplies and medicine to those in quarantine.11  Writers critical of the concept of 
quarantine often described watchmen as careless individuals: “No drop of water, perhaps, 
but what comes at the leisure of a drunken or careless halberd bearer at the door; no 
seasonable provision is theirs as a certainty for their support.”12  The parishes, which 
were desperately in need of public health workers, could not afford to be very picky in 
their selection of watchmen and the individuals who held the dangerous position of 
watchman were poor and often accepted the position out of necessity rather than civic 
duty and care for their neighbors.  These watchmen were often also stretched thin with 
one watchman guarding many buildings yet still expected to bring water, food, medicine 
and other essentials. 
The quarantine brought many sufferings to the people it was inflicted upon.  If the 
quarantine had been implemented consistent with the orders laid down then it would have 
at least been fair even if it was considered cruel.  Yet the quarantine was not consistently 
inflicted upon wealthy and important individuals, although the rich did not escape the 
quarantine completely.  In fact since most of the wealthy left the city, they would not 
have been subject to the quarantine at all, but regardless, writers during the epidemic 
frequently suggested that those in power were not being consistently quarantined with the 
same vigor as people with little wealth and influence. 
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Writers accused the wealthy and powerful of crafting their public health policies 
without expecting to such policies to be used on themselves.  An author who referred to 
himself as “J.V. grieved for the poor, who parish daily” wrote: “I dare say the doctors, 
and those who stand upon their sword to execute this violent advice upon the poor so 
generally, would not be willing to be so done unto, or have their wives and children so 
dealt with in their calamity.”13 This belief spread among many Londoners and there was 
even an attempt by commoners to shut up the Lord Mayor’s residence.14  J.V. also points 
out another flaw in the implementation of quarantine: “If one in the parish-meeting place 
fall suddenly sick, or dye, after sitting there in the crowd two or three hours amongst the 
multitude; were it not as equal the doors should be shut upon the assembly…O surely, if 
we would not be so done unto, these ways then are unequal, and this violent course not 
like to abate our plagues.”15 This last point does not necessarily demonstrate the 
inconsistent quarantining of the wealthy because likely most in a parish meeting place 
would not have been wealthy, but it demonstrates the parish’s willingness to ignore 
quarantine policy even with the risk such an inconsistency posed to public health. 
The public health policies had a built-in policy to benefit those who were wealthy 
enough to own a second house.  The policy stated that those with a second house could 
move an infected individual from their main residence to their second residence in order 
to spare the family from being forced to live with an infected and potentially dangerous 
individual.  The family was still required to be quarantined which came with its own 
consequences but spared them of one of the greatest criticisms of the quarantine policy.  
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The movement of an infected individual from one house to another required the 
supervision of a watchman and his, or her in some rare cases, wage was to be covered by 
the infected individual and his family.16  The officials who created the quarantine policies 
would have known that most would be unable to use that one policy and that only a select 
few wealthy individuals, such as the crafters themselves would be able to take advantage 
of that policy.  
In Bell’s analysis of the public health orders, he argues that the ability to move the 
sick to another building was a humane policy intended to lessen the criticism of locking 
sick and healthy together, although he also argues that in practice this aspect of public 
policy was not used.17  Even so, this order is inherently biased against the poor and 
produces a further sense that public policy gave privileges to the wealthy; further 
undermining the public’s faith in quarantine.  Instead of creating this policy, the 
authorities should have constructed more pest houses which function in a similar manner 
of keeping sick and healthy apart but is fairer and more efficient. 
Corruption and inequality in the act of shutting up extended down to the lower 
level public health officials such as watchmen and searchers.  The fear of being 
quarantined, with all of the economic, social and potential health consequences, caused 
many individuals to bribe public health officials.  Searchers who found a dead body in a 
building might be bribed to lie about the official cause of death thus allowing infected 
residences to escape quarantine.18  In his diary, Samuel Pepys reports that his parish clerk 
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informed him that he had falsified the number of plague deaths from nine to six. “Abroad 
and met with Hadley, our clerke, who upon my asking how the plague goes, told me it 
increases much, and much in our parish; for, says he, there died nine this week, though  
have returned but six: which is a very ill practice, and makes me think it is so in other 
places; and therefore the plague much greater than people take it to be.” 19 The ability to 
bribe is naturally reliant upon the ability to provide a bribe which naturally would have 
been easier for the wealthy than for those who could barely survive, but considering the 
consequences of quarantine many would have scrapped together what money they could.  
The susceptibility of searchers and watchmen to corruption was likely increased by the 
meager wages provided by the parish which were barely enough to survive on.20 
Animosity towards the quarantine and a general willingness to break the law in 
order to survive whether it be accepting bribes to supplement meager wages or the illegal 
sale of goods from infected houses, was pervasive in London.  People desperately 
attempted to avoid the quarantine.  People hide their illnesses even as they went about 
their daily business.21  Their actions out of fear of quarantine likely put others at risk and 
potentially even put the infected individual at risk.  People smuggled bodies out of houses 
in hopes that searchers would not have their houses shut up.  “others fearfully sweating 
with coffins, to steale forth dead bodies, least the fatall hand-writing of death should seal 
up their doors.”22 People broke out of quarantined houses and people broke others out of 
quarantined houses.23  The fear of quarantine made people act selfishly towards their 
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fellow citizens and lessened respect for the law and respect for the authorities.  The 
inconsistent implementation of the quarantine or at least the belief in the inconsistent 
implementation also reduced respect of the law and respect of the authorities.  Lack of 
respect for the quarantine due to these prior factors could have harmed the government’s 
public health response. 
For a quarantine to work it must remove all infected individuals away from the 
public where they would have spread the disease, yet the failure of quarantine eroded the 
whole purpose.  A failed quarantine can be seen as a wall that has been breached in one 
or more places; essentially the sections of wall that remain standing have been rendered 
useless by the openings in other sections.  Therefore those individuals who suffered under 
quarantine suffered in vain because their quarantine did not prevent the spread of the 
infection.  By the epidemic’s peak, the plague was widespread and the quarantine had 
been effectively abandoned.   
The poor, as a demographic population, were a major focus of government efforts 
to combat the plague.  The governing authorities in London knew from past experience 
that the plague would at first primarily spread amongst the poor thus the poor 
communities endangered the entirety of London by providing a breeding ground for the 
plague which could then spill over into the wealthier parishes.  The policies detailing the 
method for implementing the quarantine were crafted with the poor in mind and one of 
those orders published in 1665 explained the importance of focusing on the poor:  
“this care of the poor will much conduce to the preventing their being sick, 
and curing them when sick, and consequently give check to the growth of 
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the plague, which both began and is continued almost altogether amongst 
the poor.”24   
The policies ensured that an infected individual in quarantine would be taken care of even 
if they did not have the financial means to protect themselves.  In some ways this was 
only an extension of poor relief which took care of the poor in healthy times but the privy 
council believed that ensuring care for the infected poor would improve public support 
for the quarantine and reduce the number of people who try to violate quarantine or who 
attempt to dodge quarantine altogether.25 
Prisons, like quarantine, locked individuals into a confined space and poor living 
conditions.  During the epidemic of 1665, prisoners suffered greatly and the mortality 
rate was high.  Magistrates knew that sending an individual to prison in London during 
the epidemic was a virtual death sentence.26 What made the suffering and deaths in the 
London prison system worse was the crimes committed by many of those who resided 
therein.  Non-conformist, for the most part Quakers, were persecuted by the English 
authorities and many were imprisoned or exiled to the colonies.27  Even as the epidemic 
grew and resources were stretched thin, the government used their own resources to 
prevent non-conformists from meeting28 and pressure was put on clergy who fled London 
to return lest non-conformists should gain influence in their parishes.29  Their 
imprisonment was widespread and many among their ranks claimed the plague was a 
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punishment sent by God in response to the religious persecution.30  Charles II asked for 
records on the number of Quakers who died of the plague; he was relieved to hear that 
they suffered as much as any other group and this relieved his fear that God was indeed 
punishing him for his treatment of Quakers.31 
The government feared many of the plague’s consequences including the risk of 
civil unrest.  Some have suggested that quarantine was as much a tool of controlling the 
population as it was for stopping the disease.  Others saw the quarantine as a punishment 
that could be more arbitrarily and quickly used than the normal legal means and it could 
be justified simply as a protection of the welfare of the population.32  Regardless, the 
government was worried about unrest especially with the recent and ongoing turmoil in 
London.  One of the first actions of the government in the early stages of the outbreak 
was to banish the former soldiers of the Parliamentarian Army from London.33  A natural 
response since the Parliamentarians had killed King Charles I, the father of England’s 
current king.  Despite government fears, no major acts of unrest occurred during the 
plague and disobedience was limited to petty crimes and refusal to obey public health 
orders.34  It is likely that the plague had the effect of preventing unrest by keeping the 
streets comparatively emptier than usual and by discouraging private discourse.  Not 
every individual simply acceded to be quarantined and occasionally force was used to 
quarantine infected and healthy individuals.35 
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Consequences to the Public Health Worker: 
A major flaw in the anti-plague policies revolved around the problem finding 
people who were willing to risk their lives by completing the tasks necessary such as 
guarding the quarantined houses, searching the infected houses, and caring for the sick.  
The plague orders did not describe to the parishes how they should acquire searchers, 
nurses, watchmen, etc. only that those positions should be filled.  Thus parishes started 
acquiring their public health workers from among the poor on parish financial relief 
through coercive methods. 
In non-plague times, those on poor relief usually were required to perform small 
tasks around the parish in order to receive their poor relief.  These were often simple 
tasks such as cleaning the parish church or washing the vestments.36  These tasks were 
usually given because of the belief by the Anglican church authorities that giving away 
money freely would be socially harmful and that teaching those poor individuals good 
work ethic would help them climb out of poverty.  In plague years the poor still required 
relief and with the lessened employment opportunities there were likely more people in 
need of poor relief.  Yet now the parish had other tasks that needed to be performed so it 
was natural that they switched some individual on poor relief from the simple tasks they 
performed around the parishes to the now necessary public health tasks.   
These individuals on poor relief were compelled to perform the public health tasks 
by their usual poor relief funds, yet not everyone was willing to perform these potentially 
dangerous tasks and therefore the parish threatened to withhold poor relief.37 Even the 
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threat of prison time was available in the anti-plague orders to compel people to perform 
the public health jobs as well as to punish those who were negligent in their duties.38  
Thus the government took advantage of a vulnerable population to perform the most 
dangerous and undesirable tasks.  These tasks were necessary as part of the public health 
policies designed by the London authorities but no safeguards were put in place to ensure 
that the poor would be protected against excessive compulsion because the poor need 
money to survive and could not afford to lose their poor relief.  There was a silver lining 
in the use of the poor as public health workers.  Many women were paid to act as nurses 
for their own family members which is a task they would have performed whether or not 
they were paid and this demonstrates the parishes’ commitment to poor relief.39 
The wages provided to those public health workers was meager at best and one 
could barely survive on such a small sum of money but for many the alternative was to 
starve.40  Given the low funds available to the parishes from which to pay the public 
health workers, these meager sums were likely the best the parishes could offer.  Thus 
once again, the failure of the City to ensure that parishes received proper funding came at 
the expense of the lower class individuals who relied on those funds.  These public health 
workers were not allowed to supplement their meager income with additional 
employment even if they had free time from their dangerous and busy work.41  
The consequences of being a forced public health worker may not have been 
simply low wages and risk of death but also social stigma.  Dr. Nathaniel Hodges 
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provides what among other writers was an all too common description of the actions of 
Nurses: 
“But what greatly contributed to the Loss of People thus shut up, was the 
wicked Practices of Nurses (for they are not to be mention’d but in the 
most bitter Terms): These Wretches, out of Greediness to plunder the 
Dead, would strangle their Patients… others would secretly convey the 
pestilential Taint from Sores of the infected to those Who Were Well.”42  
When reading contemporaries’ writing about the plague, one hears about careless 
watchmen and ugly greedy nurses; the blame for much of the suffering is attributed to 
their laziness and other vices, but how much of the blame is warranted?  Since the 
authorities were unable to recruit enough workers, the public health workers they had 
were stretched thin thus unable to perform optimal work.   
In addition to the view of the public health workers as greedy and often evil, they 
were often feared, and rightly so, as potentially carrying the plague.  The writers of public 
health policies responded by requiring public health workers to carry a red rod to warn 
others and to avoid company.43  So the job of a public health worker was forced onto the 
poor and it was a dangerous, poorly paid job which in addition produced social stigma 
and fear towards these unfortunate individuals.  Some may have deserved the negative 
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Struggling with Flight from London: 
The government policies also hurt the middle class who fled London more than 
the wealthy who fled.  Certificates of health were generally required for individuals to 
enter communities outside of London.44  These certificates of health, naturally, certified 
that an individual had come from an area free of plague and were themselves free of 
plague.  Without such certificate, an individual who fled the plague would have trouble 
finding a place to stay.  The wealthy often had their own country houses to which they 
could flee, and others of importance may have been able to enter a community without a 
health certificate, such as Samuel Pepys:  “By water to Greenwich, where much ado to be 
suffered to come into the towne because of the sicknesse, for fear I should come from 
London, till I told them who I was.”45 Pepys had indeed come from London but his 
importance as a member of the Navy Board and Treasurer of the Tangier Committee was 
enough to grant him entrance.  Would some commoner have been treated in a like 
manner?  Even despite the exceptions granted to important individuals, the commoners 
and authorities in places outside London feared that certificates of health could be forged 
thus certificates were required to be printed from that point on.46 Those middle-class 
individuals who did manage to enter other towns and cities found that the authorities had 
greatly restricted their prospects for lodging.  Not only were private individuals generally 
banned from keeping lodgers but Inns were restricted also.47 One anonymous writer in 
London describes the difficulty moving into a new community: “When from infected 
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London you did run, thinking God’s visitation for to shun; and in the country wander’d 
up and down, from place to place, ad eke from town to town; and could find none that 
would you entertain, with empty pockets turn back again.”48 
Flight was a costly endeavor and certainly those who fled were compelled by a 
great fear to leave, except the wealthy for whom the cost was within their means.  
Individuals who flee still require food and the other necessities of life but now they were 
often forced to carry that burden without a source of income.  Some middle class and 
wealthier merchants were able to continue their trade as most of their customers had fled 
the city and naturally others would have sought out new work although not necessarily 
the middle-class work to which they were accustomed.  For many traders, the drying up 
of trade in the city was a plague in and of itself thus flight was necessary for financial 
reason.  Vincent Thomas described in his printed pamphlet that: “I do not blame many 
citizens retiring, when there was so little trading, and the presence of all might have 
helped forward the increase and spreading of the infection; but how did guilt drive many 
away, where duty would have engaged them to stay in the place?”49  
These individuals now needed to find a new temporary residence which came 
with its own additional costs, except for the wealthy who could go to their summer homes 
in the country side; an annual expense that they are accustomed to.  While these 
individuals were seeking new lodging in the countryside, their property back in London, 
if they still had property back in London, was at risk of being stolen by those poor 
individuals in desolate London.  Those who could afford servants could leave one to 
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watch over their belongings.50  In total, the cost of fleeing London for those middle 
wealth individuals often made their migration permanent.51 Vincent Thomas described 
the disparity in the flight of the wealthy and the poor: “Now rich tradesmen provide 
themselves to depart, if they have not country-houses, they seek lodgings abroad for 
themselves and families, and the poorer tradesmen, that they may imitate the rich in their 
fear, stretch themselves to take a country journey, though they have scarce wherewithal 
to bring them back again.”52 
The cost of flight was not just to the individual but in some cases also to those still 
living in London.  In addition to the lack of contributions to the public health fund by 
those who fled, key members of the administration also fled.  When it comes to the 
authorities of London and the numerous Parishes, one finds a mixed bag of those who 
used any excuse to flee and those who remained to perform their duty.  J. F. D. 
Shrewsbury, a modern writer on the Great Plague, notes that the Duke of Albemarle, the 
Earl of Craven, and the Lord Mayor all stayed in London but he also notes that many 
including the entirety of the court, with the exception for the Duke of Albemarle53, fled 
and argues that their flight harmed the response to the epidemic.  Many writers comment, 
usually harshly, on the flight of physicians which appears to have been widespread, 
especially those with wealthy clients.  A printed pamphlet called Salomon’s Pest House 
provides a witty example of such criticism: “The whole colledge of bodily physicians, 
and the prince of them, that wise and learned galen, prescribe for the time of Plague, that 
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of all remedies, to prevent the contagion, the best is, to flie…As this is physically 
prescribed, so it is diligently practiced, as daily experience teacheth, of all sorts of men, 
yea of the physicians themselves.”54 The flight of physicians likely had no direct impact, 
seeing as how their medical practices at best were worthless and at worst harmful, but 
impact on the morale of Londoners and the trust in the government’s response were no 
doubt harmed by the flight of physicians.  The flight of the clergy likely also had an 
impact on the morale of the poor who remained as even their “spiritual physicians” had 
abandoned them.  Their places were often filled by non-conformist preachers. 
Those who fled came to be held in low opinion by those who remained.  
Numerous writers criticize those who fled especially on the grounds that by fleeing they 
were abandoning the poor who were trapped and dying in London.  While the rich who 
fled were a frequent target of writers, members of the government and physicians who 
fled were a particular focus of anger.  The chemical physician, George Thomas even 
argued that physicians should be treated as deserters from an army: “If straglers, 
defectors, and runnawayes in an army ought to suffer loss of life and estate; I see no 
reason why these men, whose function obliges them to stand out to the last, should 
deserve less punishment if they deliver such a vast populous city to the fury of so 
implacable a foe.”55 
 
                                                          
54 I., D. Salomon’s Pest House or Tower-Royall (London: Henry Holland, 1636), Early English Books Online, 
1-2. 
55 Thomson. Loimologia. 1-2. 
51 
 
Chapter 3: The Economic Impact 
 The 1665 plague epidemic created great hardships for the people of London, both 
those who stayed and those who left.  Yet one of the most tangible sufferings, whose 
consequences lasted well beyond 1665, was the economic burden created partially by the 
destruction unleashed by the plague but more severely by the policies of the London 
government.  These policies were not just economically destructive, but they were 
unequally destructive to the poor and middle class residents of London.  For many who 
lived in London, the Great Plague of 1665 was a “plague of body and of purse.”1  This 
chapter will demonstrate that flaws in the authorities’ policies for funding a public health 
response as well restrictions placed on trade harmed the poor more than the wealthy. 
 
The Role of Geography in Health Care Quality: 
 The parish was the central location for the public health response in London, but 
not all parishes were able to respond equally.  The main problems with the parish system 
during the Great Plague were the decentralized authority responsible for carrying out 
public health orders and the lack of cooperation between parishes.  Poorer parishes were 
at a distinct disadvantage in carrying out the public health orders.  There were several 
reasons for poor parishes being unable to cope with the plague as well as wealthier 
parishes, but the most important factor was the disparity in wealth between rich and poor 
parishes.   
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Parish funds for both poor relief as well as public health relief were primarily 
raised from within the parish and only partially from outside sources.2  This became a 
problem because the poorer parishes had less people who could contribute to both the 
poor relief and public health relief funds.  Fortunately, the poorer parishes and all 
parishes in general received a significant percentage of their funds for their public health 
response from wealthy donors, especially wealthy donors that had already fled the city, 
such as William Sancroft, the dean of St. Paul’s Cathedral. “and as or charity to the poor I 
knew you had given a considerable summe (to a parish that a little money would not 
releeve) before you went.”3 Yet charity was not a government response and surely a fault 
of the government to rely on inconsistent donations.   
Compared to richer parishes, the poorer parishes in London suffered the double 
impact of less people who could afford to contribute to parish funds for poor relief and 
public health, as well as more people who were in need of parish financial assistance.  
Yet rich parishes were not as well off during the plague as might be assumed.  The rich 
parishes theoretically had more wealthy individuals who could afford to pay into the 
public health relief funds, but most of the wealthy had fled the city around the beginning 
of the epidemic.  An anonymous writer complained: “It was your duties to have 
nourished the bodies of the poor; the other fed their souls with food, and not to go away, 
but in their troubles by them for to stay.”4 Sir Edmund Godfrey in a letter to the Earl of 
Newport provides a complaint: “the poor people cry out upon the dearness of fuel and 
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want of employment, by reason of the King and the Court having been so long out of 
town, and some of the courtiers, nobility, and gentry forget their debts as well as their 
charity.”5 The parish officials tasked with collecting for the public health relief as well as 
the poor relief, which went hand in hand during the epidemic, were unable to collect from 
those who had gone out into the country.  The parishes did not have the power to go out 
and collect and the higher levels of government made no effort to gather the funds from 
Londoners abroad in the country.  The limit of the government’s ability was to demand 
that the wealthy send in their contributions to London under threat that their houses 
would be broken into and property confiscated by the constable.6   
In general, financial support to the parishes from the upper levels of government 
were absent.  Throughout the entire plague epidemic and even during previous inter-
plague periods, Parliament failed to raise funds for the relief of the sick and for the 
implementation of public health measures.7  Even after the epidemic in 1665, Parliament 
did not make any changes to their policies on towards funding public health in order to 
respond better in any potential future epidemics.8 The city treasury did not even 
contribute to public health relief until July and even then it was a meager amount 
compared to the public need.9  The lack of assistance and organization from upper levels 
of government greatly hurt the poorer parishes, especially since wealthier parishes could 
have provided organized assistance through cooperating with the poorer parishes and 
providing funds.  The lack of cooperation between the parishes is a failure not only of the 
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parishes but also the city government, which failed to provide any meaningful response to 
the severe geographic wealth stratification, although even if greater cooperation had 
occurred, the failure of the rich to contribute to public health relief would have put a 
strain on the richer parishes’ ability to assist the poorer ones.   
The cost on the parish caused by the quarantining of a residence was affected by 
several factors: the ability of a residence to cover all or part of the cost themselves, the 
number of people in quarantine, the quality of care, and the quantity of supplies allocated 
per person.  Because the parishes were for the most part making decisions on 
implementation themselves, it is likely that the quality of care received by the 
quarantined individuals varied from parish to parish and from the start of the outbreak to 
the end.  There was a belief that the poor, who relied on parish financial aid for their care, 
were not receiving adequate care nor sufficient supplies. The pamphlet, Golgotha 
lamented: “How then may poor Women with child, Widows, helpless, friendless, 
fatherless and suckling, exposed (without such help, as many have been) and half dead 
before, it may be by sudden death of their first visited nearest relation, escape the ruine of 
such further violence upon them?” 10 The strain on the poor parishes likely put a cap on 
potential spending for relief of the infected and quarantined.  It also likely forced the 
parish to put a greater financial burden on those with some money but not enough to care 
for themselves for the entire period of quarantine.  In the worst cases at the peak of the 
epidemic it appears that many of the poor and infected were no longer being taken care of 
at all.11  
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A group who suffered even before the outbreak of plague were the vagrants and 
beggars, who were officially persecuted in part because of a fear that they would spread 
the plague.12  This is a reasonable assumption but nonetheless imposes a burden on the 
parishes who would enforce this rule and would contribute to increased suffering by this 
poorest of the poor.  Yet efforts to remove beggars did not appear effective13 and there 
were perhaps more beggars following the epidemic than preceding it.  The lack of funds 
for plague relief pushed the parishes to take cruel actions that harmed many of the poor 
members of their parishes and demonstrated the cold calculated decisions taken by the 
parish authorities.  Each poor individual sickened with plague became a financial burden 
to the parish therefore the parish actually had infected individuals removed to another 
parish so the financial burden would be on them.  Records of payments indicate many 
instances in which individuals were paid to remove those infected with the plague.  Some 
records even state the reason for removing the sick as “to prevent further charge.”14  The 
richer parishes within the walls of the city were more effective at removing vagrants, who 
usually ended up in the poorer parishes which were already burdened with a large 
population and little funds. 
The burden on the parish caused by the plague and especially the anti-plague 
measures were great, but the burden on the individuals in quarantine were potentially 
greater.  Not all individuals received free care from the parish while they were under 
quarantine.  Those who did receive fully free care were usually those who had been on 
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parish poor relief before being quarantined, yet others paid for all or part of their care.  
Some paid outright, some had goods from their residence confiscated in order to cover 
the cost of their care, and others were required to take out loans from the parish or private 
individuals in order to cover the costs of their care.15 This quote from the Middlesex 
session rolls describes the parish through the constable, carrying out its task of ensuring 
that quarantined individuals did not become chargeable to the parish: “…high constable 
and his watch, when they demanded entrance into the said house to secure the goods for 
the use of the said stapleton, relieve her in her sick ness and keep her from being 
chargeable to the parish &c.”16  
Aside from the usual necessities such as food and heating, medicine was highly 
emphasized for people of all wealth levels.  Medicine was generally divided into two 
categories: “fitted for the poorer sort,” and “fitted for the richer sort”.17 London society 
appeared to emphasize the use of medicine and many writers provided lists of medicines 
regardless of the topics on which they were writing.  This includes people writing about 
the quarantine, those writing about the religious causes of the plague, and the writing of 
physicians.  In addition to the costs of medicine, food, and other care, infected individuals 
may have been forced to pay for the care of a physician, yet there were not many 
physicians left in the city as most had fled with their wealthy patients.  Dr. George 
Thomas criticized the physicians of London for wasting their patient’s money.  “I wish 
they were not Sanguini mulga, and had not onely exhausted the purse, but also the veins 
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of their miserable patients, leaving them at length in the lurch.”18 He also insists that most 
physicians only treated wealthy patients and rendered little care to the poor.19  The poor 
were forced to make do with the very few physicians that were assigned to the city and 
free service was not guaranteed.  By today’s medical standards their care was entirely a 
waste of money which could have been better spent elsewhere, but from the view point of 
the London government, physicians provided essential care and the insufficient allocation 
of physicians by the city reflects another public health failure.   
Despite the accusations that physicians extorted their patients for money and the 
Privy Council orders directed the parish to pay chirurgions, Bell argues that most medical 
care was provided for free and mostly voluntary.  “For each plague victim so certified the 
surgeons were to receive one shilling.  Nothing indicates that they had this mortality fee.  
I shall show that the medical service was mostly voluntary and largely casual.  So much 
in the Great Plague was casual.”20 Lack of payment for medical services may have been 
seen as charity from healthcare workers but also as a failure of the parishes and city 
authorities. 
Loss of income and potential future income also occurred as a result of the 
quarantine.  An individual under quarantine could not be employed nor could they sell 
their property that is already under quarantine with them.21  London residents commonly 
would put up boarders and use the rent to supplement their usual income,22 but naturally 
renters could not be accepted into a quarantined building and a stigma over formerly 
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quarantined buildings harmed rent appeal.  The ban on lodgers that was enforced within 
the city had the added consequence of forcing many who would normally live in the city 
to go outside the walls into the areas with the highest mortality in order to find a place to 
lodge.23  Former servants became a group that suffered with lodging.  After the masters 
left London they would often only leave a single servant in charge of protecting their 
property and would allow the other servants to fend for themselves.24  In some instances 
the servants would lose their employment and lodging if their master or masters died. 
Those who left their quarantine alive could very well have left it with significant 
debt, either to the parish or to private individuals.  A family may even have lost a 
working member thus decreasing their potential income following the plague.  The threat 
that hung over those in debt was the debtor’s prison which, although not as terrible as 
other prisons, was not a pleasant place to go. People in debtor’s prisons suffered during 
the plague as well, although many were able to work out deals with their debt holders out 
of generous mercy in the plague times or mostly through government pressure which was 
trying to reduce the number in debtor’s prisons during the epidemic.25 
Quarantined was a double edged problem for those unfortunate enough to be 
subjected to being shut up.  Many had to pay all or part of the costs of their care but at the 
same time were unable to work and lost income.  Some were required to take on debt 
which would persist even after the end of quarantine and those who paid outright could 
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have lost their savings, thus the consequences of quarantine were longer lasting than the 
forty days or more in which they were shut up. 
 Bell levels his main criticism of the government’s response at the meager funds 
provided for the care of the sick and poor, which came primarily through charity and the 
pest-rate. 
“through the attenuated figures disclosed in the payment books… showing 
such small sums to serve so great a need, we see darkly a huge mass of 
inevitable suffering, and privations which rendered the people more liable 
to receive infection and less fitted to combat disease.  These evils greater 
generosity might have lessened, but those whose first concern should have 
been in their alleviation had left tragic London far behind them…The cold 
fact is that the sums distributed in relief by the city, supplementing the 
poor results of the pest-rate, over the whole of its area and to the out-
parishes, to which the public contribution was in part diverted, at no time 
reached as much as £1,000 a week… the maintenance of the people was 
made possible only by the benevolence from the wealthier residents, 
which each parish separately received and distributed.”26 
Bell is convinced that widespread use of quarantine would have stopped the great loss of 
life and the lack of funds was the major factor in the city’s failure.  While a successful 
quarantine could have been effective, despite the fact that plague primarily is transmitted 
from rat to person and only rarely from person to person, it still would have been 
hampered by the city’s many other failings and general hostility to quarantine.  As Bell 
acknowledges, the funding would have at least improved the living conditions of those in 
quarantine, which regardless of the effectiveness of quarantine, would have been a 
humanitarian triumph to the infected and healthy poor. 
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Another historian, Stephen Inwood attempts to put England’s rudimentary public 
health and poor relief systems into a historical context.  He argues, that unlike the modern 
day, the funds provided to the poor and sick in 1600’s London were considered a novel 
use of public funds thus its use was often inconsistent, both within and between parishes, 
and the wages provided were meager at best.  The notion that one should be forced by the 
government to provide for the poor instead of Christian charity was rather new and the 
public health relief was viewed in a similar manner because it had the similar function of 
providing for those who could not provide for themselves.  Following the reformation 
and the dissolution of the monasteries, the role of both public health and poor relief 
became included in the duties of the city, which was less capable of or willing to address 
matters traditionally left to charity such as care for the poor and sick.27  In total, Inwood 
agrees with Bell in stating that the funds provided for public health relief were meager at 
best, and in addition the much larger suburbs had the greatest trouble with funding.28  
This was compounded by the suburbs’ less developed and inadequate administration 
which struggled in gathering funds and distributing those funds for public health use, in 
comparison to the smaller richer parishes within the city walls.29 
The historian Stephen Porter in his book The Great Plague, agrees with the 
general idea that the funds provided were insufficient, but he argues that the government 
couldn’t afford to provide large sums of money to the parishes because of the ongoing 
war with the United Provinces.30  The war with the Dutch, as Samuel Pepys notes in his 
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entry, august 31st, 1665, cost “a great deal of money,” which the kingdom could not 
spare.31 From this perspective the failure of the city to support the poor in quarantine can 
be seen as an unfortunately poor timing of events; the war and plague in the same year.  
Yet one could also argue that the governments of both England and the United Provinces 
should have considered their dying poor before their international grievances.  
Amsterdam and London were both suffering under the dual costs of war and plague. 
 
The Disruption of Trade in London: 
Trade was a major aspect of the English economy in 1665; its merchant vessels 
travelled back and forth with foreign countries as well as Britain’s own colonies.  The 
Merchants and businessmen within London relied on trade, both trade within the 
kingdom and external trade, for their livelihoods and the other residents relied on trade 
for foodstuff and other products essential to life and a reasonable standard of living.  An 
epidemic of plague has such a disruptive effect on society that it naturally also impacts 
Trade and the economy, yet it was not the plague alone but also the policies of the 
government that contributed to the decline in trade.  By the peak of the epidemic, many if 
not most of the shops within London were no longer operating.32  Either because the 
shops were quarantined or the operators no longer capable of operating their shops.  John 
Evelyn noted in his diary on October 10th that he “was invironed with multitudes of poore 
pestiferous creatures, begging almes; the shops universally shut up, a dreadfull 
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prospect.”33 Those shops that remained open, out of an excess of caution, restricted their 
access to customers.  Bowls of water and vinegar were common sights in those few 
remaining shops for customers to drop their payment.34  In turn, these customers would 
often air their food for hours if not days to purify any potential infection and some items 
would be avoided altogether. “Now roses and other sweet flowers wither in the Gardens, 
are disregarded in the markets, and people dare not offer them to their noses, least with 
their sweet favour, that which is infections should be attracted.”35 
Not all merchants remained in London during the epidemic of 1665, rather, like 
many London residents, Merchants who could afford to leave often did.  For many of the 
more upscale merchants and those who operated in wealthier parishes, their main 
customers had mostly left the city, therefore leaving had the double benefit of escaping 
the plague and continuing their trade elsewhere, while escaping the prospects of lost 
business.  For other merchants, fleeing the city, albeit costly, was considered the best 
choice even if it meant the dual cost of living abroad and losing their regular customers 
and source of income.  Yet for those who remained in London, the loss of merchants to 
flight compounded with the loss of merchants from disease.   
Goods that were brought into London were subject to destruction or quarantine by 
the authorities.  Perishable goods would have especially suffered the extended quarantine, 
and the reduction in goods would have strained the resources of London, although some 
perishable goods were exempted for the quarantine.36  A quarantine of forty days on 
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commercial products brought into the city came into enforcement before the outbreak of 
plague, as a response to its spread elsewhere in Europe,37 but as the plague epidemic in 
London progressed, the quarantine of goods and vessels became stricter.38 Yet in many 
instances merchant’s avoided the quarantine on their vessels through bribery of 
officials.39 
Upon learning of the plague in continental Europe, the British authorities started 
restricting trade with infected ports.  Merchant ships that were suspected of coming from 
these infected ports were intercepted in the Thames estuary and quarantined for an 
extended period, while ships claiming to be from healthy ports were allowed through.  
This process became risky as merchants could attempt to evade the rules by claiming to 
have departed from a healthy port when in fact they had left an infected one, thus all 
foreign ships were eventually denied entry, although this had more to do with the fear of 
Dutch Privateers than the fear of plague.40 The restriction on naval borne trade both 
reduced the available goods for London’s inhabitants to purchase and financially harmed 
merchants within the city.  The loss of trade may have been compounded by the 
impressment of British sailors into the navy in preparation for war with the Dutch, thus 
sailors who would normally be conducting trade were held by the British naval 
authorities.  These sailors were kept in quarantine for their own protection because the 
outbreak of plague was a threat to Britain’s war making capabilities.41   
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Foreign trade and trade with the colonies were only one source of trade that was 
restricted by London and other British authorities.  Internal trade was restricted although 
it was mostly the orders of other cities and towns restricting trade with London and not 
necessarily London restricting trade with the rest of Great Britain.   
“The Lords of his Majesties Privy Council, taking to their serious 
consideration, that albeit by the infinit mercy of GOD, this kingdom hath 
been hitherto preserved from the plague of pestilence, which hath long 
continued at London, and broken out in many other Towns and Places of 
the Kingdom of England; yet the danger and fear of infection is as great as 
it hath been heretofore, by the resort of many people and merchants to the 
city of London, and other places suspected, for beginning Commerce and 
Trade, and adventuring to bring into this kingdom all commodities as 
formerly, albeit the Plague is not yet altogether ceased, and that all goods 
and merchandise to be imported from thence, may be yet justly 
suspected.”42   
In this case the Scottish Privy Council was extending their ban on trade with 
infected areas and specifically names London.  While this may have been 
expedient for the Scots, it was harmful to London and reflects the weakness of 
decentralized Britain in which both kingdoms are essentially working in their own 
best interests.  As the Largest trading City on the British Isles, London naturally 
suffered the worst of trade restrictions. 
 The decreased trade in London created serious consequences for its inhabitants.  
Poorer merchants who were forced to remain in London, mainly because they could not 
afford the cost of leaving and because their poor customers generally remained, were 
strongly impacted by the decreased trade.  As a large trading center, London would have 
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held a large number of merchants who would all have suffered the loss of trade to an 
extent.  London was also an industrial center in England thus it had a large number of 
artisans, skilled labor, and unskilled labor.43  Lack of trade in London due to loss of 
people and increasing poverty as well as less trade within the Kingdom and beyond, 
meant that industry was greatly diminished and numerous laborers ceased to have 
employment.  This massive poverty, which weakened the sick and starved the healthy, 
can thusly be traced back to both voluntary and government imposed restrictions on 
trade.  Less shops open also made shopping more difficult for the average person who 
either had to walk further to buy what he needed to survive or had less goods available to 
purchase.  These people had to dare the long walk while avoiding people who could 
potentially be infected; the wealthy in London had servants who could be sent to fetch 
supplies and water.   
Merchant ships overwhelmingly avoided London and preferred other ports; 
mainly from both fear of the plague and fear of being quarantined.44  In order to simply 
receive enough essentials for the population of London to survive, the Royal Court 
offered extra compensation to merchants who shipped food into London and the even 
greater incentive that merchant vessels who traded with London would have their sailors 
exempt from being pressed into the Royal Navy.45  The lack of ships trading in London 
was not helped by the Dutch privateers who hunted English merchants in the region.46  
Restrictions on trade hurt everyone in London, both rich and poor.  Yet the rich were 
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capable of maintaining at least a basic quality of life while the poor did not have a reserve 
of wealth or sufficient other assets to go for a potentially extended period without an 
income. 
The plague was sufficient alone to reduce trade within the city through loss of life, 
and flight of merchants and potential customers, yet the government policies contributed 
to and compounded with the natural loss of trade such that a bad situation was made 
worse.  Further harming the ability of merchants, artisans and laborers to feed themselves 
and their families. Bell said, in his analysis on the plagues impact on commerce, “The 
city’s commerce was far scattered where not wholly destroyed,”47 but he makes no 
substantial distinctions between loss of trade through government restrictions and loss of 
trade directly as a result of the plague. 
In Stephen Inwood’s general History of London he provides context to the 
economic situation in London which is relevant to the plague.  One key point he notes, 
although it is no more than a brief paragraph in his book, was the great presence of city 
Aldermen in Trade groups such as the East India group or the Levant group.48  This 
provides an interesting context when analyzing their decision to restrict overseas trade 
which no doubt came at their expense.  Another aspect of the economy that is very 
relevant to a study of the plague’s impact was the dependence on rich customers for 
much of the industry of London.  Nearly a quarter of London’s work force was dedicated 
to clothing trade for which the high fashion of the nobles was a key component.49  In this 
context, the flight of the rich from the city would have had an exponentially greater 
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impact on trade because of the high presence they had in shopping, which Inwood 
describes as much an important social aspect of London as an economic aspect. 
The historian Stephen Porter tackles the issue of the plague’s impact on trade 
more extensively than the previous historian.  He acknowledges that the aldermen’s 
actions towards trade were mainly to follow the examples of other countries who had 
earlier restricted trade with areas infected with plague.50  This loss of trade, both from the 
restrictions as well as other causes linked to the plague, he argues, had a great effect on 
the quality of life of many merchants and artisans, who suffered starvation from lack of 
income. 51  As well as the wellbeing of those who found shopping more difficult with so 
many shops no longer functioning. 
 One business that flourished during the plague epidemic was crime.  Stealing 
from the dead or dying was recorded and many people were convicted.52  There were 
even claims that nurses tasked with caring for the sick in quarantine were in some 
instances killing their patients in order to seize their property.53  While the charge of 
murder by nurses appears farfetched it was a widely repeated charge seen in 
contemporary writing.  Dr. Nathanial Hodges, a physician who treated patients during the 
epidemic, said of nurses: 
 “BUT what greatly contributed to the loss of People thus shut up, was the 
wicked Practices of Nurses (for they are not to be mention’d but in the 
most bitter Terms):  These Wretches, out of Greediness to plunder the 
Dead, would strangle their Patients, and charge it to the Distemper in their 
Throats; others would secretly convey the pestilential Taint from Sores of 
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the infected to those who were well; and nothing, indeed deterred these 
abandoned Miscreants from prosecution their avaricious Purposes by all 
the Methods their Wickedness could invent; who, although they were 
without Witnesses to accuse them, yet it is not doubted but divine 
Vengeance will overtake such wicked Barbarities with due Punishment…  
And so many were the Artifices of these barbarous Wretches, that it is to 
be hoped, Posterity will take Warning how they trust them again in like 
Cases; and that their past Impunities will not be a Means of bringing on us 
again the like Judgment.”54 
 While this appears extreme, nurses were very poorly compensated for their services and 
did not necessarily perform their tasks out of care for their patients but rather out of 
necessity for their own survival.  The parishes also could not afford to be selective in who 
they choose to be nurses and other public health officials.  The most common crime, 
though, appeared to be the illegal sale of property from infected homes by its own 
owners.  Under the suffering of poverty these individuals needed the supplemental 
income, especially if their own parish could not take care of them, thus the punishment of 
people who sold their potentially infected property was a public health decision but 
harmed the wellbeing of those quarantined in desperate poverty. 
Even before the implementation of the anti-plague measures, the poor parishes 
were at an inherent disadvantage compared to the rich in coping with the outbreak of 
plague.  These inherently disadvantageous factors were commonly known by the city 
officials who knew based on prior experience that the poor would suffer the worst of the 
plague.  A report by the College of Physicians in 1665 said: “hence is it that the 
contagion has as yet kept itself amongst the poor and indigent people living in close 
houses where many families are thrust together, and where there is constantly a foul 
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offensive smell almost suffocating a stranger at his first approach.”55 The streets were 
also extremely narrow unlike in the more open streets of the richer parishes within the 
city walls.56  Sanitation was also often less developed in the poorer parishes in which filth 
was often simply dumped into the streets57 although the parish authorities attempted to 
keep the streets clean and to remove stray animals.58  The buildings in which the poor 
inhabited were built out of poorer building materials in which the fleas and rats who 
carried the plague could more easily live.  The diets of the poor were also of lower 
quality which could have harmed their bodies’ ability to fight the infection.59   
 The poorer and densely occupied areas outside of the city walls had long been a 
problem for the authorities.  London had grown rapidly during a period of economic 
growth spurred on by London’s increasing importance as a center of Trade.  Its 
employment opportunities as well as its entertainment and social opportunities brought 
every manner of person to London.  For fear of the consequences of growth, especially 
that of spreading plague, the city, Parliament, Privy Council and King all took direct 
action over many decades to restrict construction and remove vagrants and beggars.60  
Their goals met with some success inside the walls, even with the tendency of the king to 
grant exemptions to those he favored.  Fines were the limit of punishment in illegal 
construction and the need for funds prevented serious efforts to prevent illegal 
construction in the city except around the living areas of important people.61  Yet in the 
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suburbs, liberties, and out-parishes of London the authorities were ineffective at 
preventing illegal construction thus these areas became crowded, crime ridden and 
disease filled.  The inability of the authorities to control the growth of the areas directly 
outside the walls came from a general lack of authority in those areas and reflects a 
failure of London’s system of decentralized authorities and its inability to ensure that the 
large poor parishes had adequate administrations.62 
With all of the disadvantages inherently present in the poor communities, and the 
problems directly inflicted upon the poor by the plague, the government’s anti-plague 
policies compounded these problems by adding new harms on top of the harms already 
inflicted upon the poor.  The anti-plague policies did harm the financial wellbeing of 
members of all socio-economic classes but the middle and lower class individuals 
suffered a disproportionately high economic hardship.  And the economic power of the 
individual parishes was greater in the wealthier parts of the city ensuring that those who 
lived in wealthy parishes could be better taken care of.  The government’s policies failed 
the poor in this manner and the government did little once the outbreak began to rectify 






                                                          





The Great Plague in the year 1665 in London caused a devastating loss of life, yet 
it did not receive as much funds from the government and private charity as the Great 
Fire that broke out only a few months later but in which loss of life was relatively light.  
The Great Plague did not receive the same attention from writers as did the Great Fire.  
Thomas Vincent, who considers both the Great Plague and the Great Fire to be Holy 
Punishment, said, “The plague so great, so lately, should not be forgotten; yet lest the fire 
more lately, and proportionally greater…”1 How could the Great Fire have been greater 
when far fewer died than during the Great Plague?  
For the wealthy the Great Fire was personally far worse.  They fled the plague to 
their country homes or other lodging while their property in London was still intact and 
guarded by a loyal servant.  They were safe and likely suffered economic hardships well 
within their means to weather.  Then only a few months later the Great Fire came and 
took away their property and possessions, thus for the wealthy, the Great fire was a 
greater tragedy than the Great Plague.  Apparently the city and kingdom governments 
agreed because they provided less Funds for the Great Plague even as they had money to 
spare and as the parishes ran out of money. 
 The government response to the plague, was more harmful to the poor than to the 
rich.  Yet the poor appear to be more victims of circumstance rather than abuse from the 
wealthy and powerful during the Great Plague.  The plague orders appear to be the best 
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efforts of the Government to handle so great a catastrophe with so little preparation, and 
this lack of preparation may be the greatest factor in the suffering of the poor who were 
left behind in plague ridden London.  Even so, the unofficial actions and exceptions taken 
during the epidemic appear to have been taken to the benefit of the wealthy and other 
actions such as removing the sick to other parishes were harms for the poor. 
 The lack of preparation was the greatest reason for the failure of the quarantine to 
halt the plague, although inconsistencies in the application of quarantine also contributed.  
The lack of pesthouses, a poor method for gathering funds, and an insufficient number of 
public health workers and physicians assigned to institute the quarantine all contributed 
to its failure early on.  The inability to win over the public to the acceptance of quarantine 
was another contributing factor since so many people either hid their disease or bribed an 
official to avoid quarantine.  By the peak of the epidemic it was too late to bring the 
situation under control as there were not enough people available to institute a quarantine 
for so many sick individuals.   
Despite failed efforts in numerous past epidemics, the authorities did not learn 
from their mistakes and failed to ensure that they had enough funds and workers to carry 
out the tasks.  Seeing as how the poor were the chief inhabitants of the city during the 
plague and their parishes were the least capable of handling the crisis, the poor were the 
greatest victims of the government’s failures.  The wealthy, from whom the authorities 
were drawn, were able to flee and abandon the city its time of need; bringing not just 




The Great Plague in 1665 and plague in general has had a significant impact on 
the development of English medicine, and on the role of the government.  The 
development of a public health system in response to plague and the creation of the Bills 
of Mortality in the 1500’s came about as a result of the dissolution of the monasteries and 
the need for the government to take over some of the monasteries’ responsibilities.  These 
responsibilities of providing public health and poor relief were able to become more 
accepted over time as important functions of the government.  Modern medicine also 
benefited even though physicians made little innovations during epidemics of the 1600’s 
but the growing reliance of the government on a formal medical establishment created the 
foundation for future discoveries such as those of John Snow who broke with traditional 
knowledge to successfully end the 1854 outbreak of cholera in London.2 
The history of the Great Plague has implications for the modern day.  The belief 
by the poor, that they were being treated unfairly by the government created greater 
resentment for the public health orders and essentially undermined the attempts by the 
authorities to implement their planned policies.  A greater effort to achieve an egalitarian 
public health system might have stifled some of the resentment. The government 
operated under the false belief that the poor would agree that the safety of the London 
community outweighed the well-being of a few individuals in quarantine.  The 
government and other members of the upper-class were shocked by the failure of the 
commoner to follow policy.  Whether it was the urgent desire to meet with infected 
neighbors or the desire to attend funerals of friends and family, and the failure to provide 
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care for those in quarantine ensured its failure.  Quarantine is a policy that is used into the 
modern day, often to great effect, but not always.  The recent Ebola outbreaks in West 
Africa closely mirrored events in London in 1665.  Individuals in quarantine on occasion 
broke out and spread the disease further.  Many were under the belief that their 
quarantine was not for ensuring public health but rather some government or western 
conspiracy.  It is important for modern policy makers to take the human factor into 
account and to ensure that the terrible condition of quarantine is as fair and humane as 
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